Foreign direct investment in provinces: A spatial regression approach to FDI in Vietnam by Esiyok, Bulent & Ugur, Mehmet
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Foreign direct investment in provinces: A
spatial regression approach to FDI in
Vietnam




MPRA Paper No. 36145, posted 23. January 2012 18:04 UTC
0 
 
Foreign direct investment in provinces: 
A spatial regression approach to FDI in Vietnam  
 
Bulent Esiyok and Mehmet Ugur, University of Greenwich 
 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into Vietnam have increased significantly in recent 
years, with unequal distribution between provinces and regions. We aim to contribute to the 
literature on locational determinants of FDI by accounting for spatial interdependence 
between 62 Vietnamese provinces from 2006-2009. For this purpose, we estimate a spatial lag 
model using maximum likelihood estimation method. We report existence of spatial 
dependence between provinces as well as spatial spill-over effects. The results are robust to 
different specifications for weight matrices and inclusion of different explanatory variables 
and/or proxies. We also report that conventional determinants of FDI such as market size, 
domestic investment, openness to trade, labour cost, education and governance, etc. are 
significant and remain robust to inclusion of spatial interdependence.  The sign of the spatial 
dependence suggests that the distribution of FDI between provinces is subject to 
conglomeration effects.  
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Foreign direct investment in provinces: 




Locational determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been investigated 
extensively, but empirical work on determinants of FDI in sub-national units is limited to few 
studies that concentrate mainly on China. In addition, most of the empirical work overlooks 
spatial interdependence between host markets - even though foreign investors’ location 
decisions involve a choice between a number of competing host units that are related to each 
through physical distance among other factors. This is particularly the case when the 
investigation is about the distribution of FDI between sub-national units (regions or 
provinces) within the same jurisdiction. The distribution of FDI between sub-national units is 
highly likely to be influenced not only by region-specific factors (e.g., market size, labour 
costs, governance quality and human capital); but also by spatial interdependence between 
neighbouring units as the latter are affected by a common set of macroeconomic and trade 
policies. Therefore, understanding the patterns of such interdependence and the 
conglomeration/competition effects that they may generate is important in terms of research 
effort as well as development policy. 
As Blonigen et al. (2007) have indicated, spatial econometrics provides useful techniques that 
can be applied to multiple countries as well as regions within a given country to account for 
spatial interdependence. In this article, we use the spatial lag model in order to estimate the 
direct and indirect effects of spatial interdependence. Direct-effect estimates capture the 
effects of own explanatory variables on FDI within the host spatial unit. Indirect effects, on 
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the other hand, measure the effect of own explanatory variables on FDI within neighbouring 
units (LeSage and Pace, 2009; Elhorst, 2010a).  
 
FDI in 62 Vietnam provinces constitutes a highly relevant area of application for spatial 
regression models not only because of data availability at the provincial level, but also 
because, during the period under investigation (2006-2009), the FDI/GDP ratio for Vietnam 
provinces has been the highest in the region with the exception of Singapore. Furthermore, 
provincial authorities in Vietnam have been competing to attract foreign investors, using 
fiscal incentives and disseminating provincial-level data on governance quality, education, 
labour training facilities, infrastructure, etc. Theoretically, spatial analysis allows for 
discovering whether multinational enterprises consider sub-national units as complements or 
substitutes in their investment decisions. Empirically, it enhances the reliability of inference 
by incorporating spatial dependence as a specific manifestation of time-invariant fixed effects, 
which are either ignored (as it is the case in standard OLS estimations) or subsumed under a 
common intercept (as it is the case in panel data estimations). Finally, spatial analysis can 
inform policy by providing information about the extent to which FDI inflows into sub-
national units are subject to competition or conglomeration effects – and whether such affects 
are invariant to distance between neighbouring spatial units.  
 
The article is organised in six sections. Section 2 reviews the literature on locational 
determinants of FDI, with particular attention to work on FDI in sub-national units with and 
without a spatial-dependence approach. Section 3 provides contextual information on FDI in 
Vietnam, its distribution between provinces, and geographical information on the number of 
‘neighbouring provinces’ that a province would have at different cut-off points for distance.  
Section 4 introduces the spatial regression methodology and describes the data. In section 5, 
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we present the empirical findings, which consist of a set of spatial lag estimates based on 
different specifications for the number of neighbouring provinces and for different cut-off 
values for distance between provinces. We also report results from sensitivity checks 
involving use of lagged values for the explanatory variables and different measures for 
provincial-level governance quality and secondary school enrolment. Section 6 summarises 
the main findings and discusses their policy and future research implications.  
 
2. Literature review 
Reliance on a two-country (or bilateral) framework that consists of one home and one host 
country is a potential weakness in the theoretical and empirical work on locational 
determinants of FDI (Blonigen et al. 2007). There are two reasons as to why this may be the 
case. First, FDI decisions by multinational enterprises (MNEs) may be motivated by 
horizontal, vertical or complex-vertical investment considerations that must take account of 
host-country as well as third-country characteristics. For example, in the case of horizontal 
FDI, distance to and/or market potential of neighbouring countries/provinces may not affect 
the decision to invest in a particular country/province. However, such factors are highly likely 
to influence the decision negatively if the investment decision is motivated by vertical 
integration or export-platform considerations. (See, Baltagi et al. 2007; Blonigen et al. 2007). 
Secondly, FDI in a host country/province may be influenced by agglomeration or competition 
dynamics unleashed by distance or policy spill-overs between neighbouring 
countries/provinces; or by capital-market imperfections that limit the amount of capital 
available for investment in other countries/provinces once a decision is made in favour of one 
host country/province (Blonigent et al. 2007). These factors imply that analysis of FDI 





The earliest attempt at estimating the determinants of FDI by taking account of spatial 
interdependence is Head et al. (1995), who examine the role of agglomeration effects in 
determining the location of Japanese FDI in the US. They use a conditional-logit model that 
include interdependence of the location decisions and report that agglomeration effects 
between bordering states are significant. Head and Mayer’s (2004), on the other hand, 
examine the distribution of Japanese FDI in the European Union, taking account of distance-
weighted or trade-frictions-weighted GDP in adjacent regions. They report that more 
developed regions attract higher levels of FDI and that this effect is robust to inclusion of 
agglomeration measures as in Head et al. (1995). Although innovative, these studies utilise 
discrete choice models and as such they impose significant restrictions on the use of data for 
FDI levels (Blonigen et al, 2007: 1305). 
 
In between, Coughlin and Segev (2000) use a spatial error model to estimate the determinants 
of US FDI across Chinese provinces. They conclude that FDI shock in one province has 
positive effects on FDI in nearby provinces. Furthermore, they report that market size, labour 
productivity, coastal location, wages, and illiteracy rates are statistically significant, while 
transportation cost is not a significant determinant of FDI across Chinese provinces. Coughlin 
and Segev (2000) represent the first departure from the discrete choice models developed by 
Head et al. (1995) and Head and Mayer (2004). It has also motivated two seminal 
contributions by Baltagi et al. (2007) and Blonigen et al. (2007), both of whom examine the 
impact of spatial dependence on outbound US FDI.  
 
Baltagi et al. (2007) develops a model of FDI activity that allows for a variety of MNE 
motivations and spatial interactions. They report significant evidence of spatial interactions, 
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but they cannot conclude whether export-platform or complex vertical FDI motivation is the 
dominant one. On the other hand, Blonigen et al. (2007) find that spatial interdependence has 
a significant effect on the distribution of FDI between neighbouring countries and that the 
estimated parameters for the traditional determinants of FDI (i.e., for the host-country 
characteristics) are robust to inclusion of spatial interdependence terms. Nevertheless, 
Blonigen et al. (2007) also report that the existence of spatial interactions does not necessarily 
allow for robust conclusions about export-platform or complex-vertical motivations for FDI. 
This is because the estimated spatial interdependence may be sensitive to sample selection.  
 
Another innovative work in this tradition is that of Drukker and Millimet (2007), who 
illustrate the importance of third-country effects in the context of environmental policy spill-
overs. The authors examine the patterns of spatial interdependence between US states with 
respect to inward FDI at the aggregate and industry levels. They report that own state 
attributes (including the stringency of environmental protection regulations) do not have 
statistically significant effects on own aggregate FDI in manufacturing but most of the 
neighbouring state attributes have a significant effect. In a different context, Garretsen and 
Peeters (2009) estimate a spatial lag model of outward Dutch FDI to 18 countries from 1984-
2004 and also report that third-country effects are significant.  
 
Mainly due to data constraints, the volume of work on sub-national distribution of FDI in 
developing countries is small and the number of work utilising spatial regression techniques is 
even smaller. Some of the work on the distribution of FDI across Chinese provinces includes 
Cole et al. (2009), Na and Lightfoot (2006), and Du et al. (2008). Using a panel data of 30 
provinces in China over the period 1998-2003, Cole et al. (2009) report that provincial GDP 
per capita, government efficiency, anti-corruption effort, good road transportation networks, 
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and surplus of unskilled labour are significant determinants of FDI across provinces. On the 
other hand, Na and Lightfoot (2006) use cross-section data for 30 regions in 2002 and 
concludes that market size, labour quality, high labour costs, and the level of infrastructure are 
important determinants of FDI. Finally, Du et al. (2008) confirm the significance of economic 
institutions, wages and infrastructure; while they further add special economic zones, coastal 
cities to their analysis of locational determinants of US multinationals in China.  
 
In the case of Vietnam, Pham (2002) uses averaged data over the period 1988-1998 and 
provides OLS estimates of the FDI determinants in 53 provinces. The author finds that 
income per capita, labour quality and phone lines per capita are correlated with FDI flows. 
However, tax incentives do not explain the variation in FDI inflows among provinces. 
Another empirical work is Malesky (2007), who uses cross-section data with different 
measures of FDI, including new FDI projects licensed, implemented FDI as a proportion of 
registered FDI and additional capital for existing projects. To capture the effect of economic 
governance quality, the author uses a provincial competiveness index (PCI) and sub-indices of 
PCI. Only the composite index and private sector development policies sub index are 
significant for all three measurements of FDI, while the significance of sub-indices vary with 
the type of FDI used as dependent variable. Furthermore, his findings indicate that FDI is not 
related to GDP per capita, labour quality, tax incentives and FDI.   
 
Using a panel data for 60 provinces over the period 2000-2005 Vu et al. (2007) also examines 
the link between FDI and tax incentives offered by provincial governments independently of 
the national government. In line with Malesky (2007), they measure FDI as registered and 
implemented FDI. The effect of tax incentives on FDI is rejected by their study for both 
specifications but investment climate measured by the Provincial Competitiveness Index 
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(PCI), infrastructure, proximity to major markets, education are found statistically significant. 
Furthermore, wage is found to be positively related to the implemented FDI, while GDP per 
capita is found to have no effect on implemented FDI. Findings by Pham (2008) lend support 
to the relationship between education, income per capita and FDI in 64 provinces over the 
period 2002-2004. Nguyen (2006) uses panel data with longer time dimension (8 years) and 
reports that economic growth, market size, domestic investment, exports, the skill of labour, 
labour cost; infrastructure, real exchange rate and regional dummy are related to FDI inflows 
among 61 provinces.  
 
To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies that analyse FDI across Vietnamese regions 
with spatial regression techniques. In what follows, we will summarise the studies that have 
utilised spatial regression methods in the context of regions in other countries. As indicated 
above, Coughlin and Segev (2000) use a spatial error model to analyse FDI determinants in 
29 Chinese provinces. They conclude that an FDI shock in one province has positive effects 
on FDI in nearby provinces. In contrast, Sharma et al. (2010) use the spatial lag model with 
aggregate (1999-2007) and industry-level FDI data (2001-2006) in different provinces in 
China. The authors find significant spatial interdependence between FDI in Chinese 
provinces, with the competition effect being dominant at province level and mixed results at 
industry level.  At the regional level in Russia, Ledyaeva (2009) also finds weak evidence of 
competition between provinces for FDI and reports that that market size, the presence of big 
cities and sea ports, oil and gas resources, distance to the European market, political and 
legislation risks and FDI in neighbouring regions are important determinants of FDI in 
Russia. Finally, Villarde and Maza (2011) include spatially lagged independent variables in 
their analysis and conclude that there is no spatial dependence in the dependent variable (FDI) 




In this article, we aim to make three contributions to the emerging literature on spatial 
analysis of FDI across sub-national units.  First, we provide a range of empirical estimates for 
conventional FDI determinants and spatial dependence, using spatial regression models with 
different specifications for weight matrices based on different numbers of neighbouring 
provinces and different cut-off values for distance between provinces. In doing this, we follow 
LeSage and Pace (2009) and Elhorst et al. (2010b) to test for the weight matrix specification 
that best fits the data. Secondly, we provide estimates of not only direct but also indirect 
effects of the spatial interdependence on FDI. The direct effect refers to the extent to which 
FDI in a host province is affected by the province-specific explanatory variables. The indirect 
effect, on the other hand, measures the extent to which a given change in explanatory 
variables for a host province affects FDI in all other provinces. Third, we evaluate the sign 
and magnitude of the spatial interdependence coefficient to establish whether conglomeration 
or competition effects dominate in the distribution of FDI between Vietnamese provinces; and 
whether the conglomeration effect diminishes with increased distance.  
 
3. FDI in Vietnamese provinces  
Liberalisation of FDI policies in Vietnam dates back to the first FDI law, which was 
introduced in 1987 and amended several times in 1992, 1996 and 2000 with a view to provide 
a better investment climate for foreign investors. In a further effort to liberalise FDI policies, 
the Unified Law of Investment replacing previous laws and regulations was accepted in 2006. 
Equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors was the major innovation in the Unified 
Law, which was introduced to comply with the requirements of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) membership. Liberalisation of FDI policies coupled with WTO membership in 2007 
boosted FDI inflows in Vietnam. 
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The outstanding performance of Vietnam in attracting FDI is apparent in comparison with 
other top destinations in the region, as can be seen in Figure 1. While Vietnam received FDI 
inflows equivalent to 4% of its GDP in 2006, the corresponding ratio for 2009 was %8. In this 
regard, Vietnam outperformed not only China, Malaysia and Thailand from 2007 onwards, 
but also Singapore in 2008.  
 
Figure 1 FDI Inflows as percentage of GDP in selected East-Asian countries 
 
Source: Own figure based on the data from UNCTAD FDI Database 
 
Table 1 below presents the distribution of FDI by top ten investors in Vietnam, which account 
for 79% of total cumulative registered FDI. It is worth noting that FDI inflows in Vietnam are 
dominated by regional investors. Of the latter, three are members of the Association of South 
East Nations (ASEAN) - namely Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. Taiwan, Republic of 
Korea, Hong Kong and China are other regional investors. None of European countries has 
FDI commitments comparable to regional investors. Only the USA follow regional investors 
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Table :1 Top-ten sources of cumulative registered FDI in Vietnam in 2009 (millions of 
US$)  
Sources of Registered FDI 
Share of source country in 
total registered FDI (%) 
Taiwan 21528.1 12.28% 
Korea Rep. of 19843.9 11.32% 
Singapore  17304.6 9.87% 
Japan 18560.9 10.59% 
Malaysia 17926.1 10.23% 
British Virgin Islands 13690.7 7.81% 
United States 11167.9 6.37% 
Hong Kong SAR (China) 7597.7 4.33% 
Cayman Islands  6866.4 3.92% 
Thailand 5676.4 3.24% 
Total                  140162.7 79.95% 
All countries                  175309.7  
Source: Own calculation based on data from the General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam 
 
FDI inflows into Vietnamese provinces are concentrated mainly in North-Central, Central-
Coastal, South-Eastern and the Red River regions. As Table 2 indicates, ten provinces from 
these regions hold 85% of cumulative FDI in 2009. Of these ten provinces, Ho Chi Minh City 
(HCMC), Ba Ria–Vung Tau (BRVT), Dong Nai and Binh Duong of South-Eastern regions 
and stand out with 51% share in total FDI. The top three provinces in terms of FDI inflows in 





Table 2 Top-ten Vietnamese provinces with registered FDI in 2009 (millions of US$)  
Region Province Registered   FDI 
Share in 
Total  FDI 
South East HCMC 30981.6 18% 
South East BRVT 25700.2 15% 
Red River Ha Noi 22306.9 13% 
South East Dong Nai 17838.1 10% 
South East Binh Duong 13924.6 8% 
North Central and Central Coastal  Ninh Thuan 10055.9 6% 
North Central and Central Coastal  Ha Tinh 8068.5 5% 
North Central and Central Coastal  Phu Yen 8060.8 5% 
North Central and Central Coastal  Thanh Hoa 7040.3 4% 
North Central and Central Coastal  Quang Nam 5190.5 3% 
Total        149167      85% 
Source: Own calculation based on data from the General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam 
 
The map of Vietnam below provides an overview of cumulative FDI inflows in 2009. White 
areas indicate the provinces with ten lowest FDI inflows, while brown areas show the 
provinces with highest FDI inflows.  Provinces with low FDI inflows are located together. For 
instance, Ha Giang, Cao Bang and Bac Kan in the North and Dak Nong, Dak Lak and Gia Lai 
in the South-West are neighbours. By the same token, there is a correlation in space among 
provinces with high FDI inflows. Four provinces with highest FDI inflows in the South-East 
are clustered and they are surrounded by provinces with high FDI inflows as well.  
Fiscal decentralisation in 1996 and the decentralisation of FDI administration since 1987 gave 
power to provincial governments over investment incentives to foreign investors. To compete 
with provinces with relatively high cumulative FDI, provinces with low level of FDI offered 
extra incentives in the form of corporate income tax exemptions and VAT reductions and 
extended exemptions of rent - a practice known as “fence-breaking” that led to high budget 
deficits in provinces with low FDI inflows (Vu et al. 2007). The effectiveness of these 
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investment incentives is still an open question. On the cost side, most of fence-breaking 
provinces have been running budget deficits for a long time (Vu et al. 2007). Although the 
central government suspended all illegal practises on investment incentives provided by 32 
provincial governments in late 2005, the extent of violations and the timing of the termination 
of illegal investment incentives in practise are not clear. Currently 54 provinces out of 63 in 
Vietnam are eligible for investment incentives in various sectors designed to support areas 
with socio-economic difficulties as provided for in Government Decree No. 108 of 2006. 
In section 4 below, we model spatial interaction between provinces using distance-weighted 
or neighbouring-province-weighted matrices, with different cut-off values for distance and 
different numbers of neighbouring provinces. We report estimation results for spatial 
interaction with one nearest neighbour, three nearest neighbours, 186km and 350km. The cut-
off distance of 186km ensures that a province has at least 3 nearest neighbour (with an 
average of 12 neighbours), whereas the cut-off distance of 350km ensures that a province has 











Figure 2  Provincial distribution of cumulative FDI in Vietnam in 2009 (million of US$)  
 
Ha Noi and Ha Tay merged in 2007. Therefore, the cumulative FDI for Ha Noi in 2009 is equally allocated to both provinces in this figure
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4. Methodology and data 
Locational determinants of FDI at national or sub-national levels are well specified in the 
literature. We choose the most frequently-used determinants, consisting of GDP per capita, 
domestic investment, labour cost, enrolment in lower- and upper-secondary education, budget 
balance, and openness to trade. In addition, we use the provincial competitiveness index (PCI) 
and one of its components (informal charges as a proxy for corruption) as governance quality 
indicators. We specify our model as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽7𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1)  
 
In equation (1), subscripts i and t denote province and time respectively. The dependent 
variable, lnFDIit is the natural logarithm of the real cumulative registered foreign capital 
scaled by population in province i at time t; lnPCGDP it is the natural logarithm of real per-
capita GDP with base year 2005; lnDIit is the natural logarithm of real domestic investment 
scaled by population (as it is the case in  Nguyen and Nguyen, 2007); BB is budget balance as 
a ratio of provincial GDP; lnLC is the natural logarithm of real wages computed as average 
monthly compensation per employee; lnOP is the natural logarithm of trade openness defined 
as percentage share of exports plus imports in provincial GDP; lnEDU is the natural logarithm 
of the number of students in lower secondary school per 1000 people, a proxy for human 
capital; and  PCI is the provincial competitive index (PCI) as a proxy for economic 
governance quality at the provincial level. µi captures unobservable province fixed effect that 
is constant over time; δt controls for time fixed effect that is common across provinces; and εit 
is the classical error term that varies across provinces and time. 
 Equation (1) ignores potential spatial dependence in the dependent variable (lnFDI). To 
check whether spatial dependence exists, we use the residuals of the OLS estimation to 
establish whether the dependence is due to spatially-lagged dependent variable or spatially-
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autocorrelated error term.  This requires the use of Lagrange Multi plier (LM) tests proposed 
by Anselin (1988) and robust LM tests proposed by Anselin et al. (1996). In both tests, the 
null hypothesis of no spatially-lagged dependent variable or no spatially-autocorrelated error 
term must be rejected for the OLS estimation to be valid.  The main difference between the 
LM and the robust-LM tests is that the latter is capable of detecting one type of spatial even if 
the other type of dependence exists. As such, it is more powerful in detecting spatial 
dependence than the standard LM tests.  
As indicated above, spatial dependence may be of two types and both types have serious 
implications for statistical inferences. The type with less severe implications is spatial 
dependence due to spatial autocorrelations between the error terms and is usually known as 
the ‘spatial error’ problem, where the error terms are correlated because of correlation 
between neighbouring provinces in space. OLS estimates with spatially-autocorrelated error 
terms are still valid, but they would be inefficient.  The other type is due to spatial dependence 
of the dependent variable and the level of such dependence is captured by the spatial 
autoregressive coefficient. The latter coefficient measures the extent to which FDI in a given 
spatial unit is affected by FDI in neighbouring spatial units. Ignoring this type of spatial 
dependence not only renders statistical inferences invalid but also leads to biased parameter 
estimates.  
We model spatial interaction between observations by using a matrix of distance between 
spatial units, which consist of 62 provinces. The advantage of using physical distance is due 
to its exogeneity with respect to FDI (Anselin and Bera, 1998). Empirical studies use different 
specifications for distances, including the nearest neighbour, contiguous provinces, distance-
based matrices, and distance-based matrices with a critical cut-off value. The choice of a 
distance cut-off value may depend on expected level of spatial spill-overs as a function of 
travel time. However, there must be a limit to adding new data points to spatial weights by 
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increasing the cut-off distance (Anselin, 2002) due to the asymptotical feature required for 
obtaining consistent estimates. In the absence of clear guidance about the choice of cut-off 
distance, empirical studies make use of the log-likelihood and R-squared values to compare 
estimation results based on different weight matrices (Abreu et al. 2004 and Seldadyo et al. 
2010).  
We define our distance-based weights, which depend on geographical distance dij measured as 
great circle distance between provinces i and j as follows: 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗 (2)  
 
𝑤𝑖𝑗= 1 𝑑𝑖𝑗2⁄ , 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑗 < 𝑑∗ (3)  
 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑗 > 𝑑∗, (4)  
 
Here, d* is a cut-off point. The resulting matrix W is a square and symmetric matrix with 62 
rows and 62 columns. While diagonal elements of W are set to zero so that no observation of 
FDI predicts itself, off diagonal elements presents weights associated with provinces. 
𝑊 = � 0 𝑤𝑗𝑖 ⋮𝑤𝑖𝑗 ⋱ ⋮… … 0� (5)  
 
We further standardize weight matrix W so that each row sums to unity. 
𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝑤𝑖𝑗 � 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑗
�  (6)  
 
Multiplying the spatial-weight matrix W with the vector of the dependent variable lnFDIit, we 
obtain W*lnFDIjt  as a new independent variable that consist of distance-weighted values of 
the dependent variable. For robustness check, we estimate the models with different 
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specifications for the number of neighbouring provinces and cut-off distance values, including 
one nearest neighbour (denoted as W1), three nearest neighbours (W3), 186km cut-off 
distance (W186) and 350km cut-off distance (W350).  
Quite often, the spatial lag model is preferred to the spatial error model. This is because the 
former allows for obtaining a rich set of estimates for the effects of a given explanatory 
variable - including direct, indirect and feedback effects. In addition, the spatial lag model 
also allows for establishing whether spatial dependence is reflected as conglomeration or 
competition effects in the distribution of FDI between spatial units (Blonigen et al. 2007). 
However, the choice between the two models must be based on Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 
(Anselin, 1988) or robust LM test (Anselin, 1996) – as indicated above. In this article, we 
follow a decision rule that is based on the result of the robust LM test. The rule is to choose 
the more informative spatial lag estimation under two conditions: (i) if the robust LM tests 
justify this choice against the spatial error model; or (ii) if the robust LM tests indicate that 
both spatial error and spatial lag models are appropriate.  
Spatial dependence can be modelled by augmenting equation (1) as follows:  
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑊 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜓𝑖𝑡  (7)  
 
𝜓𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑊𝜓𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (8)  
 
The LM test for spatial lag tests the hypothesis whether ρ=0 in Equation (7) and LM test for 
spatial error tests if λ=0 in Equation (8). It is apparent from Equation (7) that W*lnFDI is 
correlated with the error term εit and therefore standard OLS will fail to produce consistent 




𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼 = 𝜌𝑊𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼 + 𝛼 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀 (9)  
 
Here lnFDI is a vector of dependent variable, X is the matrix of explanatory variables, ρ is the 
spatial lag term parameter, α is a vector of constant term parameter, β is a vector of 
parameters for explanatory variables and ε is the classical error term. Equation (9) can be 
solved for the vector of lnFDI with simple algebra: 
(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀 (10)  
 
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼 = (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1𝛼 + (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1𝑋𝛽 + (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1𝜀 (11)  
 
where I is identity matrix. Due to the spatial multiplier matrix (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1, lnFDI in a 
province i depend not only on its own error term, but also on the error terms of other 
provinces. This is because (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1 is a full inverse, which yields an infinite series that 
involves error terms at all provinces (𝐼 + 𝜌𝑊,𝜌2𝑊2 … . )𝜀1. As a result, the spatial lag term 
W*lnFDI also depends on the error term of other provinces. A common approach to this 
simultaneity problem is to use maximum likelihood (ML) estimation (Blonigen et al., 2007 
and Seldadyo et al., 2010), which yields consistent and efficient parameter estimates in the 
presence of spatially lagged dependent variable (Anselin, 1988,2006).   
It is also apparent from equation (11) that lnFDI in a province i is determined by factors in 
province i as well as those of neighbours because the term (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1𝑋𝛽 is equal to the 
right-hand side of equation (12) below.  
(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1𝑋𝛽 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜌𝑊𝑋𝛽 + 𝜌2𝑊2𝑋𝛽 + 𝜌3𝑊3𝑋𝛽+, … . . , +𝜌𝑞𝑊𝑞𝑋𝛽 (12)  
 
Increasing powers of the matrix W (W2, W3,… etc.) present neighbours set in more and more 
remote contiguity (second order contiguity is one’s neighbours’ neighbours and third order is 
                                                          
1 Note that the first term is identity matrix I  because ρ0W0 equals I. 
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one’s neighbour’s neighbour’s neighbours, and so on). Since ρ is smaller than one in absolute 
value, each successive term in equation (12) has smaller and smaller effect. This means that 
distant observations exhibit less and less influence as the expansion in equation (12) 
continues.   
Once the coefficients are estimated with spatial lag model, LeSage and Pace (2009) proposes 
a calculation method that decomposes the total effect into direct and indirect effects. The 
direct effect refers to change in the dependent variable caused by explanatory variables for a 
spatial unit; whereas the indirect effect, which is also known as spatial spill-over effect, refers 
to changes in the dependent variable for other spatial units due to change in the explanatory 
variable of the unit in question. According to LeSage and Pace (2009: 40), the direct effect 
can be calculated as the average of the product of the point estimates (β) with the diagonal 
elements of the unit matrix I in Equation (13).   
(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1 ≈ (𝐼 + 𝜌𝑊 + 𝜌2𝑊2 + 𝜌3𝑊3+, … . . . , +𝜌𝑞𝑊𝑞)𝛽 (13)  
 
The identity matrix I multiplied with β represents the direct effect of a given explanatory 
variable on FDI in a given province. This effect does not include the feedback effects that 
percolate from neighbouring provinces into the province in question because the off-diagonal 
elements of the matrix I are all zero. On the other hand, the second term in parenthesis (ρW) 
multiplied by β represents the indirect effects of the corresponding variable on the first-order 
neighbours of the province in question. Remember that the diagonal entries in matrix W are 
zero; hence the indirect effect on the spatial unit itself is zero. The remaining terms in the 
parenthesis in equation (13) represent indirect effects on second- and higher-order neighbours 
as well as feedback effects from those neighbours onto the spatial unit itself. The cumulative 
indirect effect is obtained by summing up the indirect effects emanating from first- and 
higher-order neighbours.  On the other hand, the cumulative feedback effect is obtained by 
adding up the feedback effects from second- and higher-order neighbours – leaving the first-




Our dataset covers 62 out of 63 provinces from six regions of Vietnam for the period 2006-
20092. Our data is obtained from General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO), with the 
exception of the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) and informal charges. These 
governance quality proxies are collected through collaborative effort between the Vietnam 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development(USAID) and the Asia Foundation3.We exclude one province (Bac Lieu) for 
which data is incomplete. The omission is dictated by the need to have a balanced panel as a 
condition for carrying out spatial regression estimations using software package in 
MATLAB4
As the dependent variable, we use the natural logarithm of real registered FDI capital (lnFDI) 
in provinces, measured in Vietnamese Dong and deflated by the GDP deflator. Our FDI 
measure is then scaled by the population of each province (obtained from GSO) with a view 
to reduce the risk of  heteroscedasticity related to scale (Baum, 2006).  
.   
In line with the empirical literature on locational determinants of FDI (Cole et al, 2009; 
Malesky, 2007; Pham 2002 and 2008; Segev, 2000), we use the log of provincial real GDP 
per capita (lnPCGDP) to capture the effect of provincial market on FDI. We expect higher 
levels of GDP per-capita to lead to higher levels of registered FDI. The log of domestic 
investment scaled by population (lnDI) is used to test the hypothesis whether domestic 
investment crowds out FDI or support it. Provinces offered various incentives and extra-legal 
tax holidays (fence-breaking) to attract FDI. This resulted in long-lasting budget deficit in 
                                                          
2 See Appendix A1 for the list of provinces covered by our sample. 
3 PCI measures overall economic governance in Vietnam at province level and consists of nine sub-indexes: 
entry   costs; land access and security of tenure; transparency and access to information; time costs of business 
start-ups; proactivity or local administration; informal charges; quality of business support services; labour 
training services; and legal institutions.  Information regarding measurement and methodology of index 
construction is available on www.pcivietnam.org . 
4 We used  sar_panel_FE function  from http://www.regroningen.nl/elhorst/software/sar_panel_FE.m for our 
spatial lag model estimations. 
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provinces (Vu et al., 2007). Hence, we include budget balance to test whether there is 
correlation between FDI and budget balance of provinces. We use budget balance (BB) 
calculated as percentage of provincial GDP.  
Trade openness of provinces may also impact the decision of multinationals with respect to 
location. Especially export-oriented multinationals firms may prefer provinces with already 
established trade links. We also take the natural logarithm of openness (lnOP), which is 
defined as sum of provincial exports and imports as percentage of provincial GDP.  Labour 
costs are assumed to be an important component of production costs and hence an important 
determinant of competitiveness when FDI is motivated by export-seeking MNEs. Therefore, 
we use compensation per employee deflated by GDP deflator as a proxy for real wage in each 
province. We expect higher wages in a province to have a negative effect on provincial-level 
FDI in that province.  
As far as human capital is concerned, we use the natural logarithm of number of students in 
lower-secondary (lnLS) and upper-secondary schools (lnUS) per 1000 people due to 
incompleteness of data for other proxies such as qualification levels of people in working age. 
We have used both measures of education to establish whether estimation results are sensitive 
to the type of education measure used. Finally, we include the Provincial Competitive Index 
(PCI) to measure the impact of governance quality on FDI. Furthermore, we use a sub-
component of PCI, namely informal charges, to establish whether corruption (CORRPT) on 
its own has a significant effect on registered FDI; and to check whether the estimation results 
are sensitive to different measures of governance quality. Higher values of PCI and lower 
values of CORRPT indicate better governance, which we assume to have a positive impact on 




5. Empirical results  
We first estimated Equation (7) once with province dummies and once with time dummies. 
However, we do not report these estimation results because of three drawbacks associated 
with the inclusion of fixed-effect or time-effect dummies in estimations involving spatial 
dependence as part of the model. The first drawback is that spatial dependence may correlate 
with unobserved province fixed effects. Secondly, spatial effects may be present but 
subsumed within province dummies (Blonigen et al. 2007). As a result, estimation of spatial 
dependence together with unobserved province effects is highly inefficient. Third, our time 
dimension is very small and it is well known that time dimension of the sample should be 
sufficiently large in order to get consistent estimates for fixed effects. As suspected, inclusion 
of province dummies resulted in insignificant spatial term (ρW*lnFDI) in our estimations. 
Furthermore, all province dummies are found to be individually insignificant but jointly 
significant regardless of weight matrix choice.5
 
 Blonigen et al. (2007) report similar results 
with respect to insignificant spatial dependence after adding country dummies.  Finally, all 
time dummies are found to be individually and jointly insignificant although the spatial term 
(ρW*lnFDI) is robust to inclusion of time dummies. Therefore, we estimated model (7) using 
the Maximum Likelihood (ML) method, excluding country and time dummies. 
Table 3 below presents our findings for the determinants of registered FDI in Vietnamese 
provinces from 2006 -2009. Panel (1) reports the OLS estimation results without spatially 
lagged dependent variable. Panel (2) presents the results of the Maximum Likelihood 
estimations of the spatial lad model (equation 7) in which the spatially-lagged dependent 
variable (W*lnFDI) is included as explanatory variable. The ML estimation results and the 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests in Panel (2) are based on different specifications for 
                                                          
5 We do not report these results here, but they are available on request. 
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neighbouring provinces and cut-off values for distance between provinces. In column (W1), 
we estimate the model with one nearest neighbour; in column (W3) with three nearest 
neighbours; in column (W186) with a distance cut-off value of 186km; and in column (W350) 
with a distance cut-off value of 350km6
Another feature of Panel (2) results in Table 3 is that they differentiate between direct and 
indirect effects of each explanatory variable, following the procedure proposed by LeSage and 
Pace (2009). As we have indicated above, the direct effect refers to change in the dependent 
variable (lnFDI) caused by explanatory variables within a given province. On the other hand, 
the indirect effect captures the change in the dependent variable within neighbouring 
provinces due to the change in the explanatory variable of the province under consideration. 
. At the bottom of the table, we first report the results 
of the LM and robust LM tests for checking the presence of spatial dependence and for 
deciding whether a spatial error or spatial lag version of model (7) is appropriate. Then, we 
report the R2 value for the OLS estimation and the corrected R2 values for the spatial lag 
models along with the number of observations and log likelihood values.  
Finally, we must indicate that the results in Panel (2) of Table 3 are derived by estimating a 
spatial lag rather than a spatial error model. The choice in favour of the spatial lag estimation 
is justified on two grounds, First, the LM test results indicate that spatial lag is the appropriate 
model for estimation with weight matrices W1, W3 and W186; and both spatial lag and 
spatial error models are appropriate for estimation with weight matrix W350. The robust LM 
test results, on the other hand, indicate that both spatial lag and spatial error models are  
  
                                                          
6 We have also used two other matrices based on two nearest neighbours and distance cut off at 500km; and the 
results are remain unchanged. 
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Table 3: Determinants of FDI with different weight matrices for spatial dependence 
    Panel (1) Panel (2) 
   OLS 
    
ML estimation with weight matrices 
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Observations 248 248 248 248 248 
LM  No Spatial Lag  7.90*** 5.37** 2.62* 2.18 
Robust LM  No spatial Lag  24.90*** 16.26*** 19.17*** 18.67*** 
LM  No Spatial Error  0.0242 0.02 0.81 0.71 
Robust LM  No spatial Error  17.02*** 10.91*** 17.36*** 17.19*** 
R2/Corrected R2 0.457 0.481 0.477 0.472 0.471 
Log Likelihood  -465.354 -461.550 -462.353 -463.925 -464.062 




appropriate for estimation with all weight matrices.  This evidence implies that spatial 
dependence exists and that this dependence can be modelled either as spatial lag or as spatial 
error. Secondly, compared with the spatial error model, the spatial lag model allows for 
estimating a richer set of coefficients that include point estimates, direct effect estimates, 
indirect effect estimates, and feedback effect estimates. Given this information-rich feature of 
the spatial lag model and given that its estimation is justified under both the LM and robust 
LM tests, we report estimation results based on the spatial lag model only. 7
In line with previous studies on Vietnam, the point estimates of the coefficients (with the 
exception of budget balance – BB) are statistically significant in the OLS estimation (Panel 
1). The results are robust to adding spatially lagged dependent variable (W*lnFDI) in Panel 
(2), where we also report point estimates obtained with different weight matrix (W) 
specifications. The coefficient of the spatially-lagged dependent variable (W*lnFDI) is 
significant and indicates a positive relationship between registered FDI in a province and that 
in nearest neighbours or surrounding provinces. The spatial dependence captured by W*lnFDI 
indicates that registered FDI capital  in a province increases by 1.1%, 1.8%, 1.5% and 1.9% as 
a result of 10 % per cent increase in the registered FDI of the nearest one neighbour, three 
nearest neighbours, surrounding provinces within a distance of 186km and those within a 
distance of 350km respectively. This positive relationship confirms the positive spatial 
autocorrelation in lnFDI results obtained from the Moran s I test, which are reported in Table 





                                                          
7 We can indicate here that, as far as point estimates for the coefficients are concerned, the spatial error model 
yielded similar results to that of spatial lag model.  
8 Moran’s I  statistic tests whether provinces, which are located closer together are more likely to have similar 
registered FDI levels than those which are further apart. The null hypothesis for this tests states that there is zero 
spatial autocorrelation in the variable lnFDI. 
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Comparing the log likelihood and R2 results for estimations with different weight matrices, 
we can see that the matrix with one nearest neighbour (W1)) yields the highest log likelihood 
R2 values. A Monte-Carlo study carried out by Stakhovych and Bijmolt (2009) shows that the 
probability of finding the true specification increases if weight matrix selection is based on 
goodness of fit criterion. In addition, Elhorst (2010c) demonstrates that the value of the log-
likelihood function should also be taken as a criterion for goodness of fit in spatial regression 
models. The combination of the two criteria implies that the weight matrix W1 is the best 
specification for our data. Although the R2 and log-likelihood values for estimations with 
other weight matrices (W3, W186 and W350) are quite similar to those obtained with weight 
matrix W1, we follow the literature and use the estimation with weight matrix W1 as the 
benchmark results for sensitivity checks later. 
                                                                                  
As far as conventional explanatory variables are concerned, our point estimates indicate that 
higher levels of GDP per capita (lnPCGDP) and domestic investments per inhabitant (lnDI) 
lead to higher levels of registered FDI capital (lnFDI). In line with expectations, provinces 
that are more open to international trade are more attractive destinations for FDI. 
Furthermore, provinces with lower real wage costs tend to receive more FDI as the coefficient 
of labour cost (lnLC) carries a negative sign. The findings with respect to openness to trade 
and wage cost suggest that FDI in Vietnamese provinces may be motivated by lower wage 
costs as a source of competitive advantage to be exploited in international trade. This 
interpretation is justified by the fact that around 50% of Vietnam’s export during the period 
under investigation (2006-2009) is realised by enterprises classified as FDI entities. The 
governance quality indicator (PCI) is positively related to FDI, albeit with small magnitude. 
Finally, our proxy for human capital (the number of pupils in lower secondary education - 
lnLS) is positively associated with FDI, implying that provinces with higher levels of lower-
secondary education tend to receive more FDI.  
27 
 
The point estimates discussed above are un-biased and more efficient when compared to 
standard OLS estimates reported in Panel (1). As indicated above, OLS estimates are 
inefficient when spatial dependence is due to spatial autocorrelations between the error terms; 
and they are biased when spatial dependence is due to spatial correlation between the 
dependent variable (lnFDI) in province i and its neighbouring provinces. Comparing OLS 
estimates with point estimates from the spatial lag model, we can see that the former tend to 
over-estimate the effects of provincial per-capita GDP (lnPCGDP), openness to trade (lnOP) 
and lower-secondary school pupils (lnLS); and they underestimate the effects of domestic 
investment (lnDI) and labour cost (lnLC).  
Although the point estimates discussed above are more relevant and reliable for inference, 
they may under- or over-estimate the true effect of each explanatory variable – depending on 
whether spatial dependence also leads to feedback effects that may be positive or negative. 
Stated differently, the point estimates overlook the likely presence of feedback effects, which 
can be calculated as the difference between the direct effect and the point estimate (Elhorst, 
2010). In what follows, we will focus on direct effects as the true measure of effects on 
registered FDI within a given province in response to a given change in one of the 
explanatory variables. This is because direct effect estimates include not only the point 
estimates but also the feedback effects - i.e., the effects that pass through neighbouring 
provinces and back into the province that instigates the change. On the other hand, we will 
focus on the indirect effect as the true measure of the how much a change in explanatory 
variable for province i affects registered FDI in all provinces with subscript j ≠ i. 9
 
  
                                                          
9 As noted by Elhorst (2010), direct and indirect effect estimates – unlike point estimates - are the true marginal 
effects (i.e., the partial derivatives of model 7).  For calculating direct and indirect effect estimates in a spatial 
lag model, we used the ‘panel_effects_sar’  function in Matlab developed by Le Sage and Pace; and adapted for  
the spatial panel models by Elhorst at http://www.regroningen.nl/elhorst/software/panel_effects_sar.m. 
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Comparing direct effect and point estimates, we can see that the direct effect are larger than 
the points estimates for four explanatory variables: per-capita GDP (lnPCGDP), domestic 
investment (lnDI), labour cost (lnLC), and openness to trade (lnOP). Hence relying on point 
estimates only would lead to under-estimated inference with respect to the effect of these 
explanatory variables. Under-estimation would range from about 0.5% to 2.2%.10
Comparing direct effects with indirect effects, we observe that direct effects are always larger 
than indirect effects. This is to be expected because the change in explanatory variables for a 
given province will first and foremost affect registered FDI in that province. The effect on 
neighbouring provinces will tend to decline as the distance between the province itself and its 
neighbours increases. For example, the indirect effect of per-capita GDP (lnPCGDP) is 12% 
of the direct effect in column W1, where the weight matrix includes the nearest neighbour 
only. When we include the three nearest neighbours (column W3), the indirect effect is 21%.  
However, the indirect effect is usually insignificant when we increase the distance to 186km 
or 350 km. Reading down Table 3, we can see that indirect effect estimates are all significant 
when the weight matrix consists of one nearest province (W1) or 3 three nearest provinces 
(W3). These findings indicate that an increase in lnPCGDP, lnDI, lnOP and lnLS in a 
particular province is conducive to an increase not only in the registered FDI of that province 
(direct effects) but also an increase in the registered FDI of its neighbours (indirect effects).  
  With 
respect to remaining explanatory variables (the competitiveness index and labour cost), the 
difference between point estimates and direct effect estimates is too small. Although the 
magnitude of the feedback effects is small in this particular case, it is important to indicate 
that the feedback effects are positive. In other words, after a change occurs in the explanatory 
variable within a given province, the change pass through neighbouring provinces and leads 
to an increase in FDI within the province that instigates the change.  
                                                          
10 The under (over) estimation is equal to the feedback effect (or the difference between direct effects and point 
estimates) as percentage of the point estimate.  
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By the same token, if wages (lnLC) in a province decreases, not only the registered FDI of 
that province itself but registered of FDI of its neighbours will also increase.  
Finally, the estimation results in Panel (2) indicate that the coefficient of the spatially-
weighted FDI (W*lnFDI) is positive and significant with different specifications for the 
number of neighbouring provinces and distance cut-off values. This implies that FDI in 
neighbouring provinces has a positive effect on FDI in a given host province. This spatial 
effect does not diminish as the number of neighbouring provinces increases from 1 to 3 or the 
distance increases from 186km to 350km. Therefore, we can conclude that the distribution of 
FDI between Vietnamese provinces is subject to a conglomeration effect, whereby the 
existence of FDI in neighbouring provinces leads to higher levels of FDI in a province.  
In what follows, we use the model estimated with weight matrix W1 to check whether our 
findings would remain robust to a number of sensitivity checks. First, we control for the 
possibility of simultaneity and dual causality in the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables by using one-period lags for the explanatory variables and the weight 
matrix W1 that which yields the highest R2 and log-likelihood function values. Because of 
using lagged explanatory variables, our observations reduce to 186 (Table 4). In general, the 
sign and significance of the point estimates and the direct effect estimates remain similar to 
those obtained with contemporaneous values in Table 3. In terms of magnitudes, estimation 
with lagged values yields slightly larger point estimates and direct effect estimates for 
lnPCGDP and lnDI; lower point estimates and direct effect estimates for secondary education 
(lnLS); and similar estimates for labour cost (lnLC), openness (lnOP) and governance index 
(PCI). The main difference between Table 3 and Table 4 concerns two indirect effects that 
have the same sign as before but are now statistically insignificant - the indirect effect of per-
capita GDP (lnPCGDP) and labour costs (LnLC).  
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Table 4: ML estimation of FDI with spatial dependence:  




Notes: t values are in parenthesis. ***, **,* denotes 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 significance level respectively.  
 
 

























































































Next, we check whether our results remain robust to changing the proxies for explanatory 
variables for which alternative measures exist. Since we have established that there is no 
discernible difference between the estimations with contemporaneous and lagged explanatory 
variables, we estimate the model with contemporaneous explanatory variables. Table 6 below 
reports the estimated results. Column (1) reports the results when we replace the number of 
lower secondary students per 1000 people (lnLS) with upper secondary students per 1000 
people (lnUS). Column (2) reports the estimation results when we use informal charges 
CORRPT instead of PCI. Since informal charges are components of PCI, we do not use them 
together. 
According to the results reported in the first column and the second column in Table 5, the 
explanatory power of the model slightly improves when we use CORRPT and lnUS instead of 
PCI and lnLS. Furthermore, there is an increase in log-likelihood value in both Column 1 and 
Column 2 results. Although both CORRPT and lnUS are significant at 5% level, they do not 
have significant indirect effects. In line with expectations, these results show that informal 
charges (CORRPT) deter FDI in provinces in Vietnam, while the number of upper secondary 
students per 1000 people has a positive effect on FDI. Other explanatory variables and the 
lagged dependent variables W*lnFDI are robust to changing alternative proxies. Budget 





Table 5: ML estimation of FDI with spatial dependence and weight matrix W1:  
Using alternative proxies for governance and education  
































































































































Observations 248 248 
Corrected R2 0.499 0.496 
Log-likelihood -457.057 -456.979 








In this article, we have conducted an empirical investigation into the determinants of 
registered FDI capital across 62 Vietnamese provinces between 2006 and 2006. Our aim was 
to contribute to the literature with novel empirical findings, drawing on recent developments 
in spatial regression methodology and a unique dataset at the sub-national level.  
First, we have established that OLS estimation ignoring spatial dependence tends to yield 
under-estimated or over-estimated coefficients. To address this shortcoming, we have carried 
out maximum likelihood (ML) estimation with spatial dependence and obtained unbiased 
estimates for a number of locational determinants of FDI examined in the literature at the 
national and/or sub-national levels. These determinants included per-capita GDP, domestic 
investment, openness to trade, budget balance, labour cost, governance quality and education 
at the provincial level. The point estimates obtained from the ML estimation are in line with 
existing evidence at the national and sub-national levels; and they remain robust to inclusion 
of the spatially-lagged dependent variable and to different specifications for weight matrices 
capturing the number of neighbouring provinces or distance between provinces.  
Our findings, however, contribute to existing evidence in a number of ways. First, they 
provide the first estimates of the spatial dependence in the distribution of registered FDI 
capital between Vietnamese provinces. The sign of the spatial dependence is positive and 
remain robust to change in the specification of the weight matrix from one nearest neighbour 
and 3 nearest neighbours to distance cut-off values of 186km and 350km. Although the 
significance of the spatial dependence decreases from 1% to 10%, the magnitude tend to 
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increase as the number of neighbouring provinces or as distance between provinces increases. 
This finding indicates that the distribution of registered FDI between Vietnamese provinces is 
subject to conglomeration effects, whereby FDI inflows to neighbouring provinces have a 
positive effect on FDI flows into a given province. A 10% increase in FDI registered in 
neighbouring provinces tends to lead to an increase of 1.2% to 1.8% in FDI of a given 
province.   
Secondly, we demonstrate that the point estimates for determinants of FDI conceal the 
potential existence of feedback effects and therefore one needs to measure direct effect 
estimates as true marginal effects. Our findings indicate that the point estimates tend to under-
estimate the true marginal effects of per-capita GDP, domestic investment, labour cost and 
openness to trade. Drawing on a recently-proposed estimation procedure, not only do we 
highlight the limitation of the point estimates but also we provide direct effect estimates that 
incorporate both the point estimates and the feedback effects from neighbouring provinces. 
Although the feedback estimates are small, they have a positive sign and as such they are 
consistent with the conglomeration effect established through the coefficient of spatial 
dependence. 
Finally, we have added to the existing evidence base by breaking down the effects of the 
explanatory variables on provincial-level FDI into direct and indirect effects. We have found 
that a one-unit change in a given explanatory variable first and foremost affects the FDI in a 
given host province. This is the direct effect, which includes second- and higher-order 
feedback effects that flow from neighbouring provinces affected by the shock in the host 
province back into the host province in question. Our findings indicate that direct effect 
estimates are larger than indirect effect estimates. Estimates of indirect effects on 
neighbouring provinces are smaller than direct effects within the host province, but their 
magnitude is significant enough to warrant special attention. Our findings indicate that 
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indirect effects on neighbouring provinces are about 12% - 20% of the direct effects on FDI 










Table A1: List of Provinces in the Sample 
REGIONS PROVINCES 
Central Highlands 
Dak Lak, Lam Dong, Dak Nong, Gia Lai, Kon Tum 
 
 
Mekong River Delta 
 
An Giang, Hau Giang, Thai Binh, Vinh Long, Soc Trang, 
Ca Mau, Long An, Can Tho, Kien Giang, Tra Vinh, Ben 
Tre, Dong Thap, Tien Giang 
 
 
North Central and Central Coastal area 
 
TT-Hue, Khanh Hoa, Quang Binh, Quang Nam, Nghe An, 
Ninh Thuan, Da Nang, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Quang Ngai, 
Ha Tinh, Quang Tri, Thanh Hoa, Binh Thuan 
 
 
Northern midlands and mountain areas 
Lai Chau,  Thai Nguyen,  Dien Bien,  Lang Son,  Cao 
Bang,  Bac Kan,  Ha Giang,  Lao Cai,  Yen Bai,  Son La,  
Hoa Binh,  Tuyen Quang,  Phu Tho,  Bac Giang  
Red River 
 
Hung Yen,  Quang Ninh,  Ha Nam,  Nam Dinh,  Hai 




Dong Nai,  Binh Duong,  Binh Phuoc,  BRVT,  Tay Ninh,  
HCMC  
 
Table A2: Moran s I Test for Spatial Autocorrelation lnFDI  
Moran s I test W1 W3 W186 W350 











































Table A3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.          Min          Max 
lnFDI     248 15.0655 2.14910 7.74161 19.49431 
lnPCGDP 248 16.0222 0.51743 15.00167 18.64245 
lnLC      248 14.2117 0.27031 13.52721 15.15096 
lnDI 248 15.1399 0.51487 13.24763 16.84037 
BB 248 -3.05303 25.74335 -129.34330 60.50403 
lnOP 248 3.57076 1.18553 -0.06860 6.61966 
PCI 248 55.38839 7.86282 36.39000 77.20000 
CORRPT 248 6.43181 0.72146 4.63000 8.35000 
lnLS  248 4.22414 0.19556 3.53035 4.65764 
lnUS   248 3.52646 0.27551 2.64107 4.05648 










Table A4: Correlation matrix 
 lnFDI lnGPC lnLC lnDI BB lnOP PCI CORRPT lnLS lnUS WlnFDI 
lnFDI  1.0000            
lnPCGDP  0.5501* 1.0000           
lnLC  0.2521* 0.6396* 1.0000          
lnDI  0.4338* 0.5095* 0.4136*  1.0000        
BB 0.3498* 0.5719* 0.3602* 0.1571* 1.0000        
lnOP  0.5436* 0.6373* 0.3538* 0.2710* 0.4296*  1.0000       
PCI  0.3433* 0.4745* 0.2758* 0.1635* 0.3786*  0.4384*  1.0000      
CORRPT - 0.0683 0.1034  -0.0086 -0.1496* 0.1270*  0.1807*  0.3097*  1.0000    
lnLS  -0.1061*  -0.3909*  -0.2551*  -0.2142*  -0.1511* -0.3266* -0.4113* -0.1407*  1.0000   
lnUS  0.2095*  -0.0508  -0.1709*  -0.0306 0.1999* -0.0320 -0.1662* -0.1405*  0.7042* 1.0000  
W*lnFDI  0.4373* 0.5080* 0.3231* 0.0549 0.4463*  0.4634*  0.3306*  0.0901 -0.1282* 0.1617* 1.0000 
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